## Stock Util Aff

### Definitions

#### I affirm the resolution, “Placing political conditions on humanitarian aid is unjust.”

#### First are the definitions.

#### Temple, a professor of economics at the University of Bristol defines political conditions-

Jonathan R.W. Temple, [Department of Economics, University of Bristol], "Aid and Conditionality", Chapter 67, Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 5, 2010.

Attaching conditions to aid starts from a reasonable [the] assumption, namely that recipient governments will typically have multiple objectives, not all of which are aligned with those of donors. Although some recipient governments will seek to promote growth and reduce poverty, these goals are likely to conflict with additional objectives that donors are less concerned with, or even actively oppose. This conflict of interest is essentially that of the principal-agent problem in the theory of incentives. The donor acts as the principal, while the recipient government is the agent. Under standard assumptions, the optimal policy for donors is to make transfers to the recipient govern- ment conditional on either the actions of the recipient, or final outcomes that are linked to those actions.

#### Humanitarian Aid is defined by the Global Humanitarian Assistance Initiative in 2014

[The Global Humanitarian Assistance Initiative, "Defining humanitarian assistance ," http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/defining-humanitarian-aid]

‘Humanitarian assistance’ is aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. The characteristics that mark it out from other forms of foreign assistance and development aid are that: it is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence it is intended to be short-term in nature and provide for activities in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. In practice it is often difficult to say where ‘during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies’ ends and other types of assistance begin, especially in situations of prolonged vulnerability. Traditional responses [include] to humanitarian crises, and the easiest to categorise as such, are those that fall under the aegis of ‘emergency response’: material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines etc.) emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes) relief coordination, protection and support services (coordination, logistics and communications).

### **F/W**

#### Because the resolution asks us whether political conditions are unjust, I value justice, defined by Plato as giving each his or her due.

#### The way that we achieve the idea of justice is through a *value criterion,* or *standard*. The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 3 justifications for why the standard is key to reach morality:

#### 1. Happiness is the only universal perception felt by human beings. You and I both feel pleasure and pain, but we conceptualize honesty and virtues differently across different people. Wellbeing is the only universal value a governmental actor can look towards.

#### 2. My standard is most coherent with the basic aims of humanitarian aid, which are to preserve happiness and maintain basic quality of life in the recipient countries. We judge how just something is by how well it achieves its purposes.

#### 3. Governments must weigh consequences—only my standard is ethical in the context of government because any policymaker must make tradeoffs and weigh between competing claims. Having an objective metric of happiness allows us to decide between different options.

Harries, editor and founder of National Interest, Senior Fellow at Centre for Independent Studies, 94 (Owen Harries, editor and founder of National Interest, Senior Fellow at Centre for Independent Studies, Spring 1993/1994, “Power and Civilization,” The National Interest)

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.

#### I contend that placing political conditions on humanitarian aid is not conducive to maximization of wellbeing.

### Contention 1

#### Firstly, political conditionality accompanying humanitarian aid exacerbates violence in recipient countries while failing to achieve its objectives

#### A: Humanitarian legitimacy requires unconditionally responding to those in need. Politicized responses create uneven interventions and tolerate ignoring outright genocide.

Pasquier 2001 [André Pasquier, Political Adviser at International Committee of the Red Cross, POLITICS AND HUMANITARIAN AID: DEBATES, DILEMMAS AND DISSENSION, “Constructing Legitimacy,” February 1, 2001, accessed 2.6.2014: <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-documents/3773.pdf>]

This confusion mirrors a world which, having abandoned the old order before a new one had been clearly established, now operates in deregulation mode, governed by a form of pragmatism hardly reconcilable with a universal humanitarian approach whose focus is people and whose goal is respect for human dignity. As a result, since the end of the Cold War the humanitarian commitment of the "dominant" States has been subject to an ethic characterized by “variable geography” dictated by their national interests. This is what led them, for example, to intervene in Kosovo but to remain completely passive when faced with the genocide in Rwanda. Another result of this state of affairs is that the humanitarian organizations either find themselves alone in coping with situations of chaos and unbridled violence that go beyond their capacity for action and far exceed their mandates, or, at the other extreme, see themselves relegated to the sidelines of operations conducted by those same States in conflicts where the political interests of the latter happen to coincide with the concerns of the humanitarian community. This, in a few words, sums up the contradictions and tensions that have encroached on the humanitarian space as a result of the upheavals following the end of the Cold War. The very grave difficulties that the humanitarian organizations have encountered in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Angola and Kosovo can undoubtedly be attributed to this type of dysfunction. Such difficulties are inevitable when humanitarian players cannot rely on an international community capable of assuming an effective role in managing the political and security aspects of crises, and therefore find themselves alone, constantly exposed to the dangers of hostilities and even deliberately targeted because of their activities.

#### Political conditions produce more conflicts- two warrants

Lischer [Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict, International Security.” Summer 2003]

This article uses deductive reasoning and extended examples to explain the conditions under which humanitarian assistance to refugees can exacerbate conflict. It argues that two often- ignored aspects of the political context are essential for explaining conflict. The first aspect is the level of politicization, or political cohesion, of the refugee group at the outset of the crisis. **[1] A highly politicized group is more likely to view humanitarian aid as a resource with which to further its political and military goals** vis-A-vis the sending state. It is possible to gauge a group's likely initial level of political cohesion from the circumstances surrounding the refugees' flight. The second significant aspect of the political context is the state response to the crisis. **[2]** Specifically, **the misuse of aid is likely when the receiving state is unwilling** or unable **to impose political order** and demilitarize the refugees. Demilitarization may entail the use of police or the army from the receiving state, external intervenors, or a multilateral peace enforcement unit. In the absence of state-imposed security, it is more likely that militants will use humanitarian assistance as a tool of war. **A hostile** or incapable receiving **state erodes the potential for nonpolitical humanitarian action.**

#### B: Decades of experience with humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan shows that politicizing the aid through conditions only subjects people to greater suffering while failing to achieve any of its stated goals.

Atmar 2001 [Mohammed Haneef Atmar, Norwegian Church Aid Afghanistan Programme, DISASTERS, “Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and Its Consequences for Afghans”, 2001, vol. 25, no. 4, p. asp]

This paper concerns one of the most critical issues of current humanitarianism, namely the politicisation of humanitarian assistance. It is important to note that in the Afghanistan context, politicisation has led to the exclusion and marginalisation of the victims in need of help. It is written from two perspectives. First, from that of an Afghan who has lived through the last 21 years of conflict and seen friends, neighbours, family members and many other innocent civilians killed in the war. Painfully, however, I have observed how morally poor the international response has been to ‘our’ disaster. It is painful to see that some of those responsible for the killing of thousands of innocent Afghans are enjoying an international climate of impunity. Even worse, some have been given asylum in the West or have become new allies to some states in the pursuit of their regional foreign policy. The other perspective is that of an ‘outsider’: an aid worker who for the last seven years has been working at the ‘coal face’, grappling with the challenges and constraints of attempting to propagate humanitarian values in an environment of ‘organised inhumanity’. Over the past three weeks, the key features of this environment have been: a massacre of civilians in Bamyan; displacement of hundreds of thousands; denial by Afghanistan’s neighbour countries of the right to asylum sought by thousands of uprooted people; the coming into effect of UN sanctions against Afghanistan. While in this situation the people of Afghanistan badly need humanitarian assistance, but the current politicisation continues to fail them.

#### C: Humanitarian aid, under political conditions, fail to be neutral- that causes conflicts

Lischer [Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict, International Security.” Summer 2003]

In evaluating their actions during militarized refugee crises, **humanitarian organizations** usually absolve themselves by focusing on the failures of states to **enforce international law.** Transferring blame to states, even if it rightfully belongs there, does not solve the difficult issue of a militarized refugee crisis, however. Even if states and the UN Security Council fail to act, or act in a way to encourage violence, refugee relief agencies still bear responsibility for their actions. **Ignoring the militarization has political effects**, just as confronting it does. **Either actively or passively, the refugee relief regime can contribute to the spread of conflict.** To avoid this result, humanitarian organizations (such as UN agencies, the ICRC, and NGOs) cannot ignore the political and military context in which they provide their services. **Despite** the desire for **neutrality, it is virtually impossible for** material **assistance to have a neutral effect in a conflict situation.** Recognizing that fact, aid organizations should press for external political and military intervention when faced with a militarized refugee crisis. Even without external assistance, it is possible, in some cases, to improve the receiving state's capability to impose political order. In extreme situations where the negative effects of assistance outweigh the benefits, humanitarian agencies must consider withdrawing or reducing assistance. In the long run, if agencies do not leverage their resources, they risk losing their moral clout when refugee assistance contributes to conflict. The travesty in the Rwandan refugee camps highlighted the urgent need to design refugee relief programs with a better understanding of their political and military impacts. In militarized refugee crises, purity of intention cannot prevent the spread of conflict.

### Contention 2

#### Secondly, political conditions damage international standing among donor countries.

#### Unconditional humanitarian aid good for United States’ hegemony--solves relations

Coughlan 2/19 [Sean Coughlan, BBC News education correspondent, "Humanitarian aid can benefit donors too, says study," BBC News, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-26259643]

They concluded that humanitarian aid could successfully change how donor countries were perceived, which would have important consequences for economic and strategic influence. The researchers say that major powers can gain more influence "by actually doing good". Using the example of competition between the US and China, the researchers say that "favourable perceptions in global public opinion" will be "a pivotal feature". But the research says that it has to be the right kind of humanitarian aid. The ability to shift international opinion, the researchers argue, depends on a perception of long-term commitment and projects that seem to be achieving successful results. They also need to be clearly linked to the donor country. In such circumstances, overseas aid "can serve an important strategic goal for those countries that give it". If it appears to be self-serving, propping up an unpopular regime or if there is no clear sign of where the aid is coming from, then there are unlikely to be any positive benefits for the donor country. The researchers focused on the impact of US projects tackling HIV/Aids in sub-Saharan Africa and how they shaped public opinion in the region. They concluded that such projects have "a strong positive effect on how US leadership has been perceived in recipient countries". 'Currying favour' The study highlights that the US spends a much higher proportion of national income on military spending than on overseas aid. But it argues that in the future, constraints on budgets will increasingly highlight the diplomatic value of spending on aid. In places receiving aid, the approval ratings for donor countries increased, said researchers. Countries wanting global influence "may increasingly seek to pursue their international interests through currying favour among foreign elites and publics", say the researchers. "Foreign aid is an obvious potential tool for this. If targeted, sustained, effective, and visible aid gives the best chance of influence, this may compel great powers to actually do good, and to be seen to be doing so, in order to do well in their global competition for influence." "Our findings suggest that policy debates about foreign aid programmes should consider not only their efficacy in achieving direct goals, but also their value in improving the donor country's global or regional standing," says report co-author Yusaku Horiuchi, associate professor in the department of government at Dartmouth.

#### US global leadership and relations is crucial to global stability and preventing major war

Kagan, 11 (The Price of Power The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs Jan 24, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 18 • By ROBERT KAGAN Robert Kagan is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.)

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn’t intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions.Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon—which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budget—and by “significant,” we are still talking about a tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficits—is to cut force structure: fewer troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security commitments, to remain the “world’s power balancer of choice,” as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as “the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East” requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a reexamination of America’s “21st century role,” although it doesn’t begin to define what that new role might be. Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, **this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace**. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment**.** It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power**,** or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.